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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COMPETITION AS POLICY REFORM: THE USE OF VIGOROUS
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, MARKET-GOVERNANCE RULES,
AND INCENTIVES IN HEALTH CARE

EMILIO VARANINI*
ABSTRACT
In health care, the increase in market concentration on both the insurer side
and the provider side has led to insurers and providers acquiring market power.
Insurers and providers, in turn, have used that market power to charge higher
prices to employers providing employees with medical care without
corresponding increases in the quality of that care. Responding more generally
to the increase in market concentration in many industries in the United States
with a range of inimical effects for the nation’s economy, the Obama
Administration suggested a range of policy solutions that this article groups
under the term “Competition as Policy Reform.” These solutions included the
use of vigorous antitrust enforcement to restore competition, the use of market
incentives to stimulate existing competition, and the promulgation of marketgovernance rules to jumpstart new competition. This article explores in detail
whether and how competition as policy reform can be instituted in health care.
It first discusses what vigorous antitrust enforcement can and cannot do to
combat the use of market power by health care actors in more concentrated
markets. Recognizing that the enforcement of antitrust law can, at best, restore
the status quo ante in terms of competition in a market victimized by anticompetitive conduct, this article also explores two other solutions: (1) the use of
market incentives to stimulate competition and (2) the promulgation of marketgovernance rules to jumpstart competition. This article finds that competition as
policy reform can be instituted in health care as an alternative to other proposed
policy solutions, such as applying the regulated utility model. Ultimately, it also
finds that the individual states—as laboratories for experimentation in our
federalist system—can play a key role in the endeavor to use competition as
policy reform in health care.

* Senior attorney in state public service in California. The author thanks Robert Berenson, Kathleen
Foote, Thomas Greaney, and Bruce Hinze for their insights. This law review article sets out the
personal views of the author only and so should not be ascribed to the California Attorney General’s
Office, any other state attorney general’s office, or any other organization or individual.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Competition as policy reform starts with issues involving the exercise of
market power—and in its extreme form, monopoly power—excepting covert
price-fixing conspiracies. Market power is the ability to charge a price higher
than the one prevailing in competitive markets. 1 As it consists in effect of the
power to control prices or exclude competition, it is interchangeable with
monopoly power. 2 A significant driving escalator of costs in our health care
system is the acquisition of market power or monopoly power by participants in
that system—be they health care providers such as hospital systems, or insurance
companies. 3 This matches more generalized concerns that increases in market
concentration—an indicator of possible market power or monopoly power—in
many industries since the Great Recession of 2008 may be causing strong
negative impacts on the national economy involving less consumer choice, less
quality, and higher prices, as well as higher profits that are not reinvested into
higher wages or into additional research and development. 4

1. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992); see
also, e.g., In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 863 (2015); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984); PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 109 (3d ed. 2007).
2. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law,
76 GEORGETOWN L.J. 241, 247 (1987). The case law takes a similar view as to market power and
monopoly power. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d at 863. Other cases and sources, however,
distinguish between market power and monopoly power, finding that the latter applies only when
a firm is restrained by its own costs, i.e., any fringe competitors left in the market do not appreciably
impact the market power. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir.
2007); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION
LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 19–20 (2d ed. 2012) (Monopoly power requires “‘something
greater’ than a finding of market power.”).
3. Several sources discuss this issue of health care costs as being a serious problem in
delivering health care in the United States as well as attempts that are under way to bring reform to
health care pricing, such as by switching from fee-for-service pricing to risk-based pricing. See,
e.g., Kenneth W. Field & Douglas E. Litvack, Health Care Merger Analysis in the Era of Payment
Reform, Competition, J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. STATE BAR CAL., Fall 2015, at 42, 44–
47. For a discussion on how the increase in health care costs may be attributed in part to market
concentration, see, for example, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of Cal. et al. at 8-12, Saint
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. Aug. 20,
2014) (No. 14-35173) (collecting studies from California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut on the
threat to health care posed by increased costs and the role of market concentration in increasing
those costs).
4. See, e.g., Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISERS 7, 14 (Apr. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf; see also, e.g., Too Much of a Good Thing,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2016, at 21–22. What constitutes a concentrated market and how much the
degree of market concentration reflects a diminution of competition as opposed to other factors
such as scale economies may require a more discerning analysis. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Hogans Lovells, Hong Kong: Does the U.S. Economy
Lack Competition, and If So What To Do About It? 2, 5–6 (June 1, 2016), https://www.ftc.
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As measured by a number of studies, such as those concerning the regions
established by the California Legislature for individuals 5 and small employers, 6
to purchase health insurance under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA), 7 health care providers (e.g., hospitals and physician medical groups)
who acquire market power are able to increase the prices charged to health
insurers. 8 Those prices are in turn passed through: first, directly as an increase
in costs for self-insured employers (“self-insureds”—those who assume the
financial risk for their employees’ use of medical providers and then contract
with insurers for administrative services and the “rent” of those insurers’
provider networks) 9 and second, indirectly to individuals and fully insured
businesses in the form of higher premiums and cost-sharing obligations. 10 This
increase in prices has not led to an increase in the quality of medical care, 11 but
gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/952273/160601doesuseconomylackcomp.pdf.
However, a more discerning analysis may lead to the concluision that the increase in market
concentration corresponds to increased prices and not to increased efficiencies such as economies
of scale. See BRUCE A. BLONIGEN & JUSTIN R. PIERCE, DIVS. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS &
MONETARY AFFAIRS, EVIDENCE FOR THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON MARKET POWER AND
EFFICIENCY (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016082pap.pdf.
5. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1399.855 (2013); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 10965.9
(2013).
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.512 (2013); see also CAL. INS. CODE §
10753.14 (2013).
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
8. See, e.g., Richard M. Scheffler et al., Covered California: The Impact of Provider and
Health Plan Market Power on Premiums, 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 1179, 1184–87 (2015);
T. Scott Thompson, ACA Exchange Premiums and Hospital Concentration in California,
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., June 2015, at 27–28, 33.
9. See David Dranove, The Anthem-Cigna Merger: A Post-Mortem, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170905.061802/full/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2017). Self-insured employers constitute a quite sizeable portion of the employment picture
in the states. See, e.g., STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR., STATE-LEVEL TRENDS IN
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 10 (2013),
http://www.shadac.org/sites/default/files/Old_files/shadac/publications/ESI_Report_2013.pdf
(noting that in 2011, almost sixty percent of employers, with more than fifty employees, offered
self-insured coverage).
10. See Scheffler et al., supra note 8 at 1189, 1192.
11. See, e.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S POLICY 100, 245 (2015); see also, e.g., N.Y. STATE HEALTH
FOUND., WHY ARE HOSPITAL PRICES DIFFERENT? AN EXAMINATION OF NEW YORK HOSPITAL
REIMBURSEMENT 8 (Dec. 2016), https://nyshealthfoundation.org/uploads/resources/an-examina
tion-of-new-york-hospital-reimbursement-dec-2016.pdf; Martin Gaynor et al., The Industrial
Organization of Health Care Markets 53 J. ECON. LITERATURE 235, 247 (2015). (“[B]oth mortality
and expenditures are lower in less concentrated markets . . . .”); Bob Kocher & Ezekiel J.
Emmanuel, Overcoming the Pricing Power of Hospitals, 308 JAMA 1203, 1214 (2012) (“Moving
from [a model of] hospitals [as] price setters to a market in which patient demand drives hospital
prices and quality improvement” requires “systems that [concentrate on] outcomes as opposed to
activity, [and that] are focused on service and quality” as opposed to volume.).
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it has slowed wage increases as employers and their workers have to bargain for
the coverage of these increased costs. 12
However, the increase in costs accompanying the acquisition of market
power in the health care industry is not limited to health care providers. The
market concentration of insurers has also resulted in premium increases—
though California’s use of an active purchaser model for selecting insurance
products for individuals and small businesses who shop for health care plans on
its exchange has in the current market appeared to have acted as a
counterweight. 13
These developments all raise the question of how to address issues arising
from the gain or maintenance of market power flowing from market
concentration in health care. Is that the job of antitrust law exclusively? Or is
there a role to play for other options working in tandem with antitrust law to, in
effect, use competition norms as the spearhead of policy reform? This article
answers these questions by stating that there is a role in implementing
competition as policy for vigorous antitrust law enforcement, for incentives to
increase competition, and for market-governance rules that address the gaps in
vigorous antitrust enforcement and in the use of incentives.
This article then concludes with thoughts on the often-overlooked role of the
states in furthering competition in health care markets as the reason why states
need to consider the use of competition as policy reform. 14 Given that providing
health care services amounts to one-sixth of the nation’s economic output, 15 the
answers to the questions posed above assume a special importance in terms of
addressing the more general questions involved in remedying inimical effects
from market concentration arising from 2008. And ultimately, how these
questions can be answered will determine whether competition itself as policy

12. See MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., MAKING HEALTH CARE MARKETS
WORK: COMPETITION POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE, ACTIONABLE POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS, AND THE STATES 3 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf.
13. See Richard M. Scheffler et al., Differing Impacts of Market Concentration on Affordable
Care Act Marketplace Premiums, 35 HEALTH AFF. 880, 881, 883–87 (2016); see also Health
Insurance Industry Consolidation: What Do We Know from the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the
ACA, and What Should We Ask?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Competition Pol’y, & Consumer Rights, 114th Cong. 12 (2015) (testimony of Leemore
S. Dafny); Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on your Premium: Consolidation in the U.S.
Health Ins. Industry 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 15434, 2009),
http://www.bu.edu/sph/files/2010/10/Dafny-Duggan-Ramanarayanan.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of Cal. et al., supra note 3, at 5.
15. Natalie Jones, Health Care in America: Follow the Money, NPR (Mar. 29, 2012, 4:58 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2012/03/19/148932689/health-care-in-america-followthe-money (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
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reform is a superior alternative to other non-competition based options, such as
a regulated utility model. 16
II. BACKGROUND ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND REMEDIES
To understand the role that vigorous antitrust enforcement can play in
executing competition as policy, it is necessary to begin by noting that the scope
of antitrust law and the reach of the remedies that it provides rests on two issues:
(1) the conduct at issue, and (2) whether a firm has market power (absent certain
narrow exceptions). Because the analysis of market power under antitrust law,
in turn, rests on economics, including specific studies and models relating to
health care, this section will first discuss how economics has contributed to the
assessment of antitrust issues. Next, it will discuss how economics has informed
the definition of markets and hence the assessment of market power in the health
care context. Then this section will discuss how the antitrust laws classify
business conduct into one of three categories: (1) joint conduct, (2) unilateral
conduct, or (3) mergers and acquisitions.
A.

Use of Economics in Antitrust Law
The United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
developments in economic thinking can lead to changes in antitrust analysis. 17
The California Supreme Court has articulated the presumptions to be applied to
the review of pharmaceutical settlements between brand drug manufacturers and
generic drug manufacturers based on economics. 18 Thus, to understand how the
courts determine the metes and bounds of health care markets, the touchstone
for assessing market power, it is helpful to start with the economic studies and
analysis of these markets to which courts increasingly refer.
B.

Economic Measurement of the Metes and Bounds of Health Care Provider
and Insurer Markets and the Implications for Prices
In looking at why challenges by federal and state antitrust authorities to
horizontal provider acquisitions generally failed through the early 2000s—
erroneously so as it led to court approval of acquisitions that caused anticompetitive effects 19—health care economists developed the so-called two16. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
85, 129 (2015); see also Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win
Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH
AFF. 973, 979 (2012).
17. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015) (The U.S. Supreme Court
stated that it has “felt relatively free to revise [its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves
and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”).
18. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 850–51 (Cal. 2015).
19. See, e.g., Cory S. Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of
Economics on Hospital Merger Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 460 (2014); see also, e.g.,
Steven Tenn, The Price Effects Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction,
18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 65, 69–70 (2011).
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stage model of health care markets. The first stage—and the key one for
purposes of determining market shares—involved providers bargaining with
insurers for inclusion in those insurers’ networks at a set price. 20 Once an
employer selected an insurer, the second stage would involve the employees of
that employer choosing an individual provider 21—a choice that would largely
be based on non-price factors such as referrals, word-of-mouth, and reputation,
though employers and insurers are making efforts to change that dynamic. 22
Because choices made in the second stage were based on non-price factors, the
second stage would not play the same role as the first stage in assessing the scope
of relevant health care markets from the perspective of antitrust law. 23
As far as the markets for large employers directly purchasing insurance or
self-insured employers “renting” a network (with the insurer serving as an
Administrative Service Organization (ASO)) may be concerned, this two-stage
model set out how those networks had to be broad and deep enough to be
attractive to the employees of these large companies. This means that if a
network was missing key components necessary to making these networks
attractive to such employees, such as the existence of providers for most kinds
of medical care close to where employees live and work, 24 the existence of such
holes would, all else being equal, make that network less desirable. Accordingly,
as providers grow by acquiring hospitals (“horizontal acquisitions”) and setting
up affiliations with physician groups that can direct referrals to those hospitals
(“vertical acquisitions”), 25 they can expand these network holes, enhancing their
bargaining leverage vis-a-vis insurers even if the market share of an individual
hospital or an individual physician group of that provider group was otherwise
modest. 26
20. See Capps, supra note 19, at 460.
21. See id.
22. See Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
671, 682 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d
775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d
327, 342 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 193 (D.D.C. 2017),
aff’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A good synopsis of the two-stage model, based on evidence
and economic analysis submitted by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in such cases as the St.
Luke’s case, can be found at Field & Litvack, supra note 3, at 43–44.
24. That employees demand the availability of health care services close to where they live
and work has been recognized in the case law. See, e.g., Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d at
342; Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 778 F.3d at 784–85; In the Matter of Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 10 (F.T.C. 2007); Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp.
3d at 204.
25. See Roger D. Blair et al., Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1, 6 (2016).
26. See, e.g., UAS Mgmt., Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hosp., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81, 90 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008); see also, e.g., In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No.
9315, at 57–58 (F.T.C. 2007).
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Applying this two-stage model, economists have found the following: (1)
horizontal acquisitions can and have increased market power—leading to
increases in prices charged to insurers even if there is a significant group of
employees who travel far for medical care; 27 and (2) vertical acquisitions can
and have increased market power—leading to increases in prices due to referral
effects, e.g., the increased steering of patients by a formerly independent
physician group to an acquiring hospital or hospital system at the expense of
competing hospitals. 28 Furthermore, using this model, there are studies finding
that cross-market provider acquisitions, e.g., health care provider systems in a
given county entering a new market in a different county by acquiring a provider,
can result in price increases. 29
As far as insurers are concerned, there are two aspects to the economic
analysis of their health insurer markets. One aspect is calculating the insurers’
shares of the markets for the sale of products for fully insured employers and
self-insureds (whether those products are viewed as being sold in one market or
in two markets) to assess market power. The determination of the metes and
bounds of this aspect of insurer markets is influenced by three factors: (1) the
27. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 470–72,
475 n.5 (7th Cir. 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Submitted by 33 Economists in Support of the
FTC and State of Illinois at 7, 9, 12, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841
F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016); Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d at 343; Consent Brief of Amici
Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants Urging Reversal at 6, 8–9, Fed.
Trade Comm’n et al. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr. et al., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 1:15cv-02362); St. Alphonsus Medical Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 778 F.3d at 784 n.10; Motion for Leave to File
Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors at 7, St. Alphonsus Medical Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St.
Luke’s Health System, Ltd. et al., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW);
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 749 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2014) (relying on
insurer testimony as to the two-stage market).
28. E.g., Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician
Practices Is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756, 756–57 (2014);
Julie A. Carlson et al., Economics at the FTC: Physician Acquisitions, Standard Essential Patents,
and Accuracy of Credit Reporting, SPRINGER 303, 306, 311–12 (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/economics-ftc-physician-acquisitions-standard-essential
-patents-accuracy-credit-reporting/carlsonetal-physicianacquisitions2013.pdf; Ann S. O’Malley et
al., Rising Hospital Employment of Physicians: Better Quality, Higher Costs?, ISSUE BRIEF, Aug.
2011, at 1–2, 4 (increasing hospital employment of physicians in turn leads to an increase in
referrals that can raise costs without increasing quality absent reform of the payment structure);
Robert S. Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of Acquisitions
in New York State, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 58, 77 (2006).
29. See Leemore Dafny et al., The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers 25 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2017); Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum,
Hospital Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, 48 RAND J.
ECON. 579, 581 (2017); Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Diagnosing Hospital System
Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks, 7 AM. ECON. J. 243, 244 (2014); Gregory S. Vistnes
& Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A Holistic Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253,
259 (2013).
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specialization of insurers, with some insurers gearing their products for the
individual and small group market, and others designing their products for large
group and ASO markets; 30 (2) the role of state agencies as gatekeepers regarding
entry into their insurance markets, which can impose general requirements such
as financial stability as well as specific requirements that depend on the nature
of the market in question; 31 and (3) whether certain insurers will never be able
to obtain anything more than a slice of business in a given market because of
limitations in demand for their particular business model, with Kaiser—an
integrated, closed system that provides insurance and has its own providers—
being such an example in California. 32 Studies have found that the acquisition
of market share by insurers in employer markets (large group and ASO) has led
to higher prices for employers. 33
Another aspect in market analysis is calculating the market share of an
insurer purchase of health care services from health care providers to assess its
market power vis-a-vis those providers. The determination of the scope of such
upstream or supply markets focuses on how an anti-competitive reduction in
upstream prices can reduce downstream services, e.g., reducing the quality or
output of medical care or limiting provider availability. 34 For this reason, the
economic literature refers to this set of circumstances as monopsony to
distinguish it from the more familiar monopoly situation. 35
Cases do exist in which insurers were seen to have monopsony power. 36
Studies have found that insurers can exercise monopsony power. 37 Indeed, while
a monopsony analysis focuses on the negative incentives for upstream markets
by an anti-competitive reduction in price, to the extent that providers perceive
30. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 188, 194 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855
F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). More broadly, the determination of the relevant market for health care
purposes can either focus on the services being provided such as acute in-patient services or primary
care physician services, see Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 778 F.3d at 784–85; Cal. v.
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2001), or on the nature of the payors
who are receiving or furnishing services, see, e.g., Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 194; In the
Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 55 (F.T.C. 2007).
31. See, e.g., Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 187–88.
32. See id. at 205.
33. See, e.g., Scheffler et al., supra note 13, at 886; Thomas Greaney, New Health Care
Symposium: Dubious Health Care Merger Justifications—The Sumo Wrestler & ‘Government
Made Me Do It’ Defenses, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 24, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/
02/24/dubious-health-care-merger-justifications-the-sumo-wrestler-and-government-made-me-do
-it-defenses/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017); Dafny et al., supra note 13, at 1, 3.
34. See Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 237.
35. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 4, at 2.
36. See Joseph M. Miller & Brian C. Lewis, Monopsony and Health Plan Mergers: Does
Anthem-Cigna Signal a Shift in Policy?, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L (Sept. 2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/North-AmericaColumn-September-Full.pdf.
37. See, e.g., Dafny et al., supra note 13, at 29.
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the acquisition of leverage by insurers to be present, that perception can
encourage providers to combine—via conduct or merger—and thus ultimately
increase prices. 38 But, as a general matter, the courts struggle with when exactly
coordinated reductions in upstream prices by downstream purchasers can be
viewed as being anti-competitive precisely because they believe that consumers
still benefit from lower prices. 39
C. Analysis of Joint Conduct by Independent Firms: Per Se, Quick Look or
Structured Rule of Reason, and Full Rule of Reason
Joint conduct by independent firms can be analyzed via one of three different
paths: (1) per se illegality, (2) quick look or structured rule of reason, or (3) full
rule of reason. These paths fall along a spectrum rather than being mutually
exclusively categories. 40 For example, in the so-called eBooks case in which
Apple was ultimately found guilty of having orchestrated a per se illegal pricefixing conspiracy with four out of five book publishers, there were factual
disputes over the purpose of the conspiracy (e.g., to thwart Amazon’s low-cost
pricing of eBooks versus introducing a new Apple iBooks product to compete
with Amazon) and over the degree of coordination involved. 41 To buttress the
treatment of this conspiracy as being per se illegal, the federal government and
several states therefore introduced evidence of actual price increases in the
eBooks market because of Apple’s conduct. 42 While that kind of check can be
germane to a quick look analysis or structured rule of reason analysis (the
concept of which is explained below) and certainly is relevant to a full rule of
reason analysis (also explained below), it is not supposed to be required for a
per se illegal analysis of joint conduct.
Moreover, it can be tricky to determine which category may be appropriate
for addressing certain types of business conduct. This can be illustrated by
thinking about the formation of independent physician medical groups as
opposed to those groups entering price-fixing arrangements with their
competitors or affiliating with large provider systems. The formation of an
independent physician medical group as a venture of formerly independent
physicians to deliver coordinated care most likely presents competitive concerns
only in their initial formation. However, when that medical group then enters
price-fixing arrangements with their competitors to obtain bargaining leverage
with plans, or when it affiliates with a hospital provider system to that end, then

38. See Miller & Lewis, supra note 36.
39. Compare, e.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 989 n.6, 990 (9th
Cir. 2000), with, e.g., Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Trust v. Trina Solar Ltd., 833 F.3d
680, 689 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1582 (2017).
40. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999).
41. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 291, 327 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
42. See id. at 310.
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issues can arise. And as far as provider systems themselves are concerned, a case
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that a dominant
hospital provider system in a town in Ohio, whose hospitals still were
independent for some purposes, could be functionally treated as if it were an
agreement between independent actors rather than as an integrated entity. 43
For certain types of joint conduct, e.g., secret price-fixing agreements
among competitors known as cartels, market power need not be shown
collectively or individually, and it is conclusively presumed (and thus cannot be
rebutted) that excuses or justifications do not exist for that kind of conduct.
Hence that kind of conduct is referred to in legal terminology as per se illegal or
hardcore conduct. 44 For other types of joint conduct, e.g., the eBooks pricefixing conspiracy or an agreement among independent physicians to fix the fees
charged to insurers, such conduct can still be treated as per se illegal, with no
showing of market power required and no excuses or justifications accepted, so
long as a check is performed to make sure that such conduct should be treated
as being equivalent to a cartel. 45 That check can involve ascertaining if any
asserted pro-competitive efficiencies supporting that joint conduct are plausible
or if there are factual indicia, such as a market-wide increase in prices,
supporting the treatment of that joint conduct as per se illegal. 46
However, joint conduct cannot be shielded from treatment as being per se
illegal, or even be found to be legal in a quick look, a structured rule of reason,
or a full rule of reason context, if the justifications in question are related to noncompetition related goals. For example, the courts have rejected justifications
based on the asserted need to create private intellectual property rights 47 or to
combat low pricing or predatory pricing by a competitor. 48 Rather, the
achievement of those goals, or the balancing of those goals with competitionrelated concerns, is left to government agencies and the enactment of additional
laws by state legislatures or the U.S. Congress. 49 This is an important point for
43. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936, 945 (6th Cir.
2016).
44. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY 2
(Jan. 2007), http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37921908.pdf.
45. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 327–28.
46. See, e.g., id. at 328–30.
47. See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457,
467–68 (1941).
48. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 331–33.
49. For example, under federal antitrust law, if physicians form a venture solely to bargain
jointly with insurers on fees, i.e., there is no evidence of any plausible pro-competitive efficiency,
that venture is treated as per se illegal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S.
332, 354–55 (1982); Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,025, 67,027
(Oct. 28, 2011). In a reaction to the Maricopa decision, the California Legislature proceeded down
a different path in allowing providers to create “efficient[ly]-sized” contracting units. CAL. BUS. &
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health care: Issues regarding the adequacy of provider networks and
corresponding provider pricing raise concerns closely similar to these cases
involving non-competition related issues and as such should be addressed by
government actors rather than by private entities who may otherwise use these
issues as an excuse to engage in anti-competitive conduct. 50
Joint conduct that is not per se illegal can be struck down as being illegal
under either a quick look, a structured rule of reason analysis, or a full rule of
reason analysis. A quick look analysis involves conduct that an observer with
just a rudimentary understanding of economics can view as anti-competitive; in
such an eventuality, not only is a showing of market power not required but also
the burden shifts to defendants to proffer pro-competitive reasons justifying that
conduct. 51 Conversely, a reverse quick look analysis may also be employed to
dismiss cases where the conduct in question is obviously pro-competitive to an
observer with just a rudimentary understanding of economics. 52
However, in such circumstances the courts have increasingly turned to a
structured rule of reason—though they have not forbidden the use of quick look
analysis altogether. 53 A structured rule of reason allows a court to presume
conduct to be anti-competitive if certain facts are shown without having to do
the full market analysis to determine market power, or alternative analysis of
market-wide effects, required in a full rule of reason context. 54 However, in
contrast to quick look, the presumption of anti-competitive effects can be
rebutted. 55 And while justifications or excuses for business conduct may be
offered by defendants, a structured rule of reason can enable courts to disallow
the assertion of certain justifications—if supported by economics—while
allowing for the possibility that other justifications may exist to which a court
should give more detailed consideration. 56
One example of the application of a structured rule of reason is tying, which
is the forced sale of one product together with another separate product (though
alternatively tying has been characterized as being subject to a quasi-per se
illegal mode of analysis). 57 Another example of such an application would be
PROF. CODE § 16770(d)(e); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.6; CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.6.
Nonetheless, such contracting units can still be struck down under the same antitrust standards
applicable to other presumptively legal enterprises, such as the rule of reason. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1342.6.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 252 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d,
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
51. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770–71 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
53. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 329–330.
54. See, e.g., In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 862 (Cal. 2015).
55. See, e.g., id.
56. See id. at 869–70.
57. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why Ties Without a Substantial
Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 463, 466 (2016); see also,
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reverse payments in the pharmaceutical context, i.e., a large monetary or nonmonetary payment by a brand manufacturer to a generic manufacturer (or vice
versa) to limit competition in a market for a certain drug. 58
If conduct is subject to a full rule of reason analysis, a plaintiff must show
either anti-competitive effects arising from that conduct—or show that such
effects are likely to arise—before the burden shifts to a defendant to proffer procompetitive reasons for that conduct. 59 A plaintiff may show such effects in one
of two ways: (1) by showing directly that anti-competitive effects have arisen
from the conduct in question, e.g., an increase in market prices or a decrease in
output, such that market power may be presumed in what is known as a direct
effects analysis, 60 or (2) by showing that a defendant has a sufficient market
share from which market power may be presumed 61 in combination with a
showing that the conduct in question is likely to cause anti-competitive effects
if a firm has market power. 62

e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927,
939, 981–82 (2016) (noting that tying is “tilted in favor of plaintiffs by dispensing with the need to
show foreclosure as to the tied product.”).
58. See In re Cipro I & II, 348 P.3d at 850.
59. See id. at 862.
60. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986)
(noting that direct effects evidence is enough under the rule of reason); Toys-R-Us v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that one way to prove market power is “through
direct evidence of anticompetitive effects”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984); cf. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 63–67 (F.T.C. 2007) (showing actual price increase by merged entity
in post hoc merger analysis was enough to demonstrate anti-competitive analysis where regression
analysis, pre- and post-merger documents of the merged entity, and testimony from insurers all
supported the conclusion that the price increase arose from the market power of the combined entity
and not from any competitively-benign factors).
61. E.g., Tops Market, Inc. v. Quality Market, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining
that market power “may be proven directly by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of
competition, or it may be inferred from one firm’s large percentage share of the relevant market”).
62. E.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129–30 (2d
Cir. 1995) (noting that allegation of defendant’s market power was not enough where plaintiff
failed to meet burden under rule of reason of showing that restraint was likely to lead to anticompetitive effects); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984) (“[I]f it seems that the defendant does have the power to restrain trade substantially, then
inquiry proceeds to the question whether the challenged practice was likely . . . to help rather than
hurt competition.”); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12
(1999) (“[T]here must be some indication that the court making the decision has properly identified
the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually are
anticompetitive. Where . . . the circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex, assumption
alone will not do.”).
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Insofar as market shares are concerned, though more than a fifty percent
market share is normally required for an antitrust conduct action to prevail, 63 the
courts have both avoided requiring a set market share to prevail and have
carefully emphasized that the market share required for joint conduct need not
be as high as for a monopoly cause of action (discussed in more detail below),
as witnessed by case law involving tying 64 or exclusive dealing. 65 Indeed,
63. E.g., AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, at 249–50 (noting that although some courts have
found less than fifty to sixty percent market shares can still create a jury question as to market
power, commentators recommend that “[b]ecause it would be rare indeed to find that a firm with
half of a market could individually control price over any significant period, we would presume
that market shares below 50 or 60 percent do not constitute [market] power.”). But even those
commentators, who have had a lot of influence on antitrust law, note that the market shares required
to show market power may, as a practical matter, depend upon the degree of confidence that a
market has been properly defined: “If the court’s confidence is high that a relevant market has been
identified that properly groups close substitutes, excludes non substitutes, and is protected by high
entry barriers, then market shares along the lower range of acceptability are permissible.” Id. at
243.
64. Tying arrangements condition the sale of one distinct product or service (the “tying
product”) on the sale of another distinct product or service (the “tied product”) or the agreement
not to purchase the tied product or service from any other supplier. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
461–62 (1992); see also Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936). The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that tying can be per se illegal if the defendant has market power in
the market for the tying product. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15–17
(1984). Market power is the “ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.” Eastman
Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503
(1969)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that market power in the tying product market will be
inferred if “the seller’s share of the market is high.” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. at 17. In determining what market share of the tying product market is sufficiently high
to infer market power, the Court has rejected a thirty percent market share as being sufficient. Id.
at 26–27. However, the Court has never defined a specific market share threshold for inferring
market power, id. at 37 n.6 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and has held that a firm need not have a
monopoly or dominant position in the tying product market for it to have market power, United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (“[T]hese decisions do not
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for
a tying product.”).
65. Exclusive dealing agreements, in which a distributor agrees to distribute only the goods of
a certain manufacturer to the detriment of other manufacturers, are subject to full rule of reason
treatment because these “agreements can achieve legitimate economic benefits (reduced cost, stable
long-term supply, predictable prices).” Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2004). To draw an inference of anti-competitive effects under
this full rule of reason analysis, plaintiffs must show a significant enough foreclosure share in the
relevant market, i.e., that the exclusive agreement covers a significant percentage of the relevant
market for a sufficiently long enough a period that these agreements may give the defendants
market power and drive rivals out of the market, all other factors being equal. See, e.g., Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 45 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle,
S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 123–24 (1st Cir. 2011); Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 373 F.3d 57 at 66;
Eastern Food Servs. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004); Omega
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recently a lower court accepted a market share as low as 26.4% as being
sufficient to demonstrate market power given other market factors. 66 Although
that case was reversed on appeal, the appellate court left undisturbed the notion
that a set minimum market share is not required for a showing of market power. 67
In the realm of health care, this is an important point for both providers and
insurers because modest market shares may, as discussed above, still allow for
the exercise of market power.
Moving on from the assessment of market shares, once a plaintiff makes the
requisite showing of direct effects or of a sufficient market share from which a
presumption of market power may be made, a defendant can then show the
existence of pro-competitive justifications or excuses as a defense. 68 If a
defendant can make such a showing, the question is then raised of whether a
plaintiff may show the existence of substantially less restrictive practical
alternatives to the conduct in question that would achieve the same goals as those

Envtl, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 1997); Twin City Sportservice, Inc.
v. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982). The foreclosure market
screen requires a minimum market share for these agreements of twenty percent to forty percent.
See, e.g., Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 373 F.3d at 68; Twin City Sportservice, Inc., 676 F.2d at
1301 (holding twenty-four percent foreclosure sufficient). The use of this foreclosure market screen
does not involve only the exclusive dealing agreement under consideration but also other exclusive
dealing agreements in the relevant market, see Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 373 F.3d at 66, as
well as any tying agreements, see Twin City Sportservice, Inc., 676 F.2d at 1301, as well as any
tying agreements, see id.
66. United States et al. v. Am. Express Co. 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 190–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d
on other grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co,
No. 16-1454, 2017 WL 2444673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). The actual criteria for proving a relevant
market, either for rule of reason purposes or for monopoly purposes, are beyond the scope of this
article but can be traced back to a trio of cases, United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 380–81 (1956), Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962), and United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1966). For purposes of this article, it is important
to note that the question of what constitutes the relevant market is a highly fact-dependent one. See,
e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The scope of the
market is a question of fact as to which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.”); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he determination of a relevant market is a
factual question to be resolved by the District Court.”); In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 57 n.67 (F.T.C. 2007) (“However, market definition
fundamentally is a question of fact.”). Because appellate courts can, and have, reversed illsupported factual determinations adverse to the government, including in the health care merger
context, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 339 (3d Cir.
2016) (“[T]he District Court erred in both its formulation and its application of the proper legal
test” for determining the relevant geographical market.), the highly fact-dependent nature of
defining a market does not preclude this article’s call for vigorous antitrust enforcement even as it
suggests that such vigorous enforcement has inherent limits.
67. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 201 n.47 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted on
other grounds sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 2017 WL 2444673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017).
68. See, e.g., id. at 195.
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for which the defendant engaged in the conduct in question in the first place. 69
Under a full rule of reason, a plaintiff may make such a showing, but the plaintiff
carries the burden of showing that such an alternative, in fact, would apply;
under a structured rule of reason, a plaintiff has to plead the existence of such
alternatives but a defendant may be the one to bear the burden of showing that
such alternatives do not, in fact, apply, as in the tying context. 70 Assuming for
the sake of argument that substantially less restrictive, practical alternatives do
not exist, the court (or the jury) must then balance pro- and anti-competitive
effects. 71
To this point, this analysis has assumed that the firms participating in the
joint conduct are all willing participants. If one of the participants is not willing,
e.g., that participant was coerced into the conspiracy because of another
participant’s market power, the case law unequivocally recognizes the necessary
predicate of joint conduct in the context of tying. 72 Outside of the context of
tying, the case law is split as to whether the necessary predicate of joint conduct
is present if one of two participants was coerced into participating by the market

69. See, e.g., Emilio E. Varanini & Jonathan M. Eisenberg, Jr., Antitrust Restrictions on
Technology Companies and Electronic Commerce, in E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 27 (Ian
Ballon ed., 2014).
70. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 57, at 515 (acknowledging presumption against accepting
justifications for tying based on less-restrictive alternatives but then criticizing the Supreme Court
for not considering the incentives and monitoring cost problems that those alternatives raised “in
some cases”); Hemphill, supra note 57, at 981–82 (making same point but advocating that the
defendants have the burden of producing evidence supporting their justification for the tying). Both
articles, which are generally supportive of applying presumptions in the tying context, do illustrate
nonetheless the limits of such presumptions in the minds of commentators when faced with factdependent circumstances. Thus, while both articles support this article’s call for increased antitrust
enforcement, they also illustrate the limits of such enforcement to the extent that even noted
commentators in the antitrust field who are sympathetic to antitrust plaintiffs may be uncomfortable
with overly broad presumptions. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
466–67 (1992) (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust
claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record.’”) (quoting
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925)).
71. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990); see Cal. Dental Ass’n
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (goal of analysis is to identify “net procompetitive
effects”). The full balancing step of pro- and anti-competitive effects—to determine if anticompetitive effects outweigh pro-competitive effects—has been left to the finder of fact at trial
without any guardrails at the trial level on how that balancing should be done or who carries the
burden of proof. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 486–87 (1992)
(Scalia, J. dissenting); Capital Imaging Assoc., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass’n, 996 F.2d 537,
543 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing and quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918);
AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH 23, THE RULE OF REASON 174
(1999).
72. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 461.
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power of the other participant, though at least under state law, the balance of the
cases tends toward recognizing the existence of a conspiracy. 73
This leaves the question of what kind of conduct has been, or may be thought
to, violate antitrust laws in the health care context as to insurers and providers.
Under federal law, the formation of a venture of physicians for the sole purpose
of bargaining for higher prices with insurers has been found to be a per se illegal
violation. 74 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the State of Michigan
alleged that an insurer violated antitrust laws by insisting on most favored nation
clauses in provider contracts where providers could not offer a better deal to
rival insurers; that case ultimately was dismissed after the State of Michigan
passed a law outlawing such clauses. 75 And there was a lawsuit against a
provider system, comprising four out of the five total hospitals in Toledo, Ohio,
which alleged the provider system pressured insurers to exclude the fifth hospital
from their networks so as to increase prices. 76
There is other health care related conduct on which discussion has taken
place as to whether that conduct violates the antitrust laws. Examples of such
conduct (on the part of providers) include all-or-nothing clauses, forcing insurers
to include all components of a provider system on pain of including none,77 and
anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses, which prevent insurers from charging higher
prices for higher cost individual providers or from steering patients to lower cost,
equal or higher quality providers. 78
Recent studies have shown that provider systems with market power can use
such clauses to increase prices and deprive patients of choices. 79 Courts,
commentators, and the federal antitrust agencies have noted that such conduct

73. See, e.g., Kathleen Foote & John F. Cove, Jr., Monopolization, in CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST
(Cheryl Lee Johnson ed., 2016).
74. See sources cited supra note 49.
75. United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668–69, 676 (E.D.
Mich. 2011) (denying motion for summary judgment); Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1–
2, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28,
2013) (No. 2:10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM).
76. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC, v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936–38 (6th Cir.
2016) (involving a provider system of independent hospitals that orchestrated a group boycott of a
competing hospital by insurers). There are other cases involving similar, exclusionary conduct.
E.g., Agreed Final Judgment & Stipulated Injunction Between the State of Tex. & Mem’l Hermann
Healthcare Sys. at 1, Tex. v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., No. 2009-04609 (Tex. Dist.—Harris
Cty. [281st Dist.] Jan. 26, 2009).
77. E.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. C 12-04854 LB, 2013 WL 2422752, at *14 (N.D. Cal.
June 3, 2013); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Coping with Concentration, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1564,
1565 (2017).
78. See, e.g., MARTHA COAKLEY, MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., EXAMINATION OF
HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 41 (2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/
healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf; see also Greaney, supra note 77, at 1565.
79. See, e.g., COAKLEY, supra note 78, at 41.
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 6–8
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can be treated as tying and hence can constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. 80
This is true whether that conduct is carried out directly (via contract) or
indirectly (via coercive pricing). 81 Furthermore, a district court recently rejected
a motion to dismiss for a case brought by the U.S. DOJ and the State of North
Carolina alleging that a dominant health care provider system in Charlotte
violated federal antitrust law by imposing express contractual conditions that
barred steering by insurers. 82
This discussion thus illustrates that vigorous antitrust enforcement can
address an extremely wide range of joint anti-competitive conduct by individual
firms. However, it also begins to shed light on the limits of such enforcement in
implementing competition as policy, a theme to which this article will return.
D. Analysis of Unilateral Conduct by Individual Firms: Illegal Acquisition or
Maintenance of a Monopoly
A monopoly, for purposes of antitrust law, has generally been found to be
present when a single firm has a market share of greater than sixty to sixty-five
percent. 83 The courts are more reluctant to find a violation of antitrust laws based
on actions by an individual firm, as opposed to joint conduct, because of the
greater risk of penalizing legitimate business conduct 84—which is why a higher
market share is required for a monopoly finding.
Moreover, it is not illegal to be a monopolist. 85 Rather it is only illegal when
a company uses illegal means to acquire or maintain a monopoly, i.e., conduct
that the law considers exclusionary 86 or predatory. 87 Exclusionary or predatory
conduct where monopolies are concerned includes tying, exclusive dealing,

80. See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,030
(Oct. 28, 2011); FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE
OF COMPETITION 34 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improvinghealth-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723
healthcarerpt.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 912 (9th Cir. 2008);
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundling, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 397, 402–03 (2009).
82. United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK, 2017
WL 1206015, at *1, *9 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017).
83. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir.
1997); Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 48. A firm can also be liable for attempted
monopolization as well as monopolization itself, see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S.
447, 456 (1993), though a discussion of that concept is beyond the scope of this article.
84. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–430 (2d Cir. 1945).
86. See Varanini & Eisenberg supra note 69, at 55–56.
87. See id. at 62–63.
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certain kinds of bundled pricing, 88 and below-cost pricing where the losses in
question can be recouped at a later date. 89 And while arbitration itself is not
inconsistent with the antitrust laws, even if it does not involve the more formal
process of the courts or facilitate class actions, a dominant firm’s coercive
antitrust arbitration clauses—with terms that make remedying such a violation
more difficult, if not impossible—is a different kettle of fish. 90 Indeed, the
antitrust laws can view behavior committed by a monopolist as anti-competitive
that would be seen as pro-competitive if committed by a non-monopolist. 91
As with the rule of reason, a plaintiff must show that a firm has a monopoly
and that its actions have, or will likely lead to, an anti-competitive result such as
increased prices, lower output, lower quality, or lower choice. A defendant can
offer a pro-competitive justification for its conduct, though a plaintiff may show
a substantively less restrictive alternative. And if both anti-competitive and procompetitive effects flow from a company’s unilateral acts, those effects are to
be balanced by the ultimate trier of fact. 92 Such monopoly cases have been
brought in health care. 93
More vigorous antitrust enforcement going forward would allow for
monopoly cases to be brought to remedy the same kind of anti-competitive
conduct discussed above in the joint conduct section of this article: where an
individual firm has market power approaching monopoly levels and where its
coercion of its counterparties (e.g., a monopolist insurer coercing providers or a
monopolist provider coercing insurers) may make a court reluctant to infer joint
conduct.
But while litigation can blaze the way for addressing such anti-competitive
conduct, ultimately legislation may be a far more effective tool for carrying out
competition as a policy goal. 94 The reason for this is that courts, proceeding on

88. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 901, 903, 912 (9th Cir.
2008).
89. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
90. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 42 (2015). This same logic may apply in markets that involve market
concentration with only a few firms but do not actually involve a monopoly as such. See id. at 42.
91. See e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Whether certain
conduct committed by a monopolist such as exclusive dealing should be presumed anti-competitive
does not affect the points made in this article and is therefore beyond its scope.
93. E.g., Complaint at 14, United States & Tex. v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11cv-00030 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011) (alleging monopolization of hospital services market through
loyalty “discounts”).
94. For example, the U.S. DOJ and the State of Michigan brought a lawsuit against Blue Cross
Blue Shield, alleging that its use of most favored nation clauses in its contracts was anticompetitive. United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D.
Mich. 2011). After this lawsuit survived a motion for summary judgment, id. at 679, Michigan

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

COMPETITION AS POLICY REFORM

87

a case-by-case basis, must act prudently in each individual case to ensure that
they are not inappropriately second-guessing individual business decisions. 95
Legislation does not suffer from that same need as it reflects public value
judgments on the utility of business conduct as a general matter.
Of considerable importance to assessing the limits of vigorous antitrust
enforcement in this area, is the consideration of whether parallel but independent
anti-competitive conduct by market participants—that taken together have
monopoly power—can constitute a violation of antitrust law. Commentators
have made the interesting argument that such conduct may constitute a shared
monopoly and hence should be treated as a de facto monopoly under the antitrust
laws, 96 but no court has accepted such an argument to date. 97 Moreover, while
older case law exists treating such conduct as a violation of unfair competition
law in circumstances where the market is an oligopoly (generally four or fewer
firms with entry being difficult), the perceived skepticism on the part of the
courts regarding this concept has apparently inhibited the bringing of such cases
by federal enforcers. 98 This is an important point: Worries about anticompetitive conduct have involved more than one participant in a given health
care market, 99 and studies have found aggregate anti-competitive effects from
multiple participants in health care markets. 100 It is a point that is thus suggestive
of an independent need for legislation in carrying out competition as a policy
goal.

passed a law banning such most favored nation clauses, see Order of Dismissal without Prejudice
1, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 28, 2013). This lawsuit was then dismissed due to the passage of that legislation. Id. at 2.
95. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010).
96. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1187 (2013).
97. See, e.g., JOHN MILES, HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST L. § 5:17, Westlaw (database updated
July 2017). The theory of shared monopolies needs to be distinguished from conspiracies to
monopolize, which is viable as a legal theory. Id.
98. See, e.g., SUSAN A. CREIGHTON ET AL., PRESENTATION AT WORKSHOP ON SECTION 5 OF
THE FTC ACT AS A COMPETITION STATUTE: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SCOPE OF SECTION 5
4–5 (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc
-act-competition-statute/screighton.pdf.
99. See, e.g., Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 29, at 255.
100. See Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in California,
Especially Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, 53 J. HEALTH CARE ORG.,
PROVISION, & FIN. 1, 6 (2016).
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E.

Antitrust Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
A merger of two firms, or the acquisition of one firm’s assets by another
firm, violates antitrust law where there may be a substantial lessening of
competition or where there is a tendency towards the creation of a monopoly. 101
Applying this standard, antitrust law has barred acquisitions or allowed the
retroactive unwinding of otherwise completed acquisitions involving horizontal
acquisitions of competitors 102 and vertical acquisitions of upstream suppliers or
downstream retailers. 103
A substantial lessening of competition is presumed under the law where the
merger or acquisition significantly increases market concentration in a relevant
market. 104 This is because the state of competition is a proxy for consumer
welfare under the antitrust laws and because competition itself involves not only
price but also quality, output, innovation, and choice. 105 However, federal and
state antitrust agencies as well as the courts will look at a variety of other factors,
such as the innovator status of a firm being acquired or whether the merging
firms were previously close competitors, either to establish that an anticompetitive effect is in fact likely or to address a rebuttal by defendants of the
market concentration presumption. 106
101. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (commonly referred to as Section 7 of the Clayton Act). Congress
used this phraseology to indicate that it was concerned with probable effects arising out of mergers
rather than effects provable to a certainty, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d
708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2001), thus supporting the ability of federal and state government agencies to
block mergers and acquisitions before their consummation.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 369–71 (1963).
103. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 571–79, (1972); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323–24, (1962). A discussion of the history of the proscription of
vertical mergers and of allowing vertical mergers after the imposition of certain conditions, can be
found at Jaime Stilson, et al., Reading the Tea Leaves: Evaluating Potential Antitrust Concerns in
Vertical Mergers Between Insurers and Health Care Providers, 30 ANTITRUST 11, 11–16 (2015).
104. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d
775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2015).
105. See AYESHA BUDD ET AL., CONTRIBUTION TO INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK’S 10TH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE: COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AND CONSUMER WELFARE SETTING THE
AGENDA 10 (May 17–20, 2001), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc857.pdf.
106. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 3–4 (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/100819hmg.pdf; Field & Litvack, supra note 3, at 43. Speaking generally, the method for
proving a relevant market for assessing the competitive effect of a merger or acquisition is the same
as it is for rule of reason or for monopoly purposes. See, e.g., PHILIP AREEDA et al., supra note 1,
at 107. But this extended inquiry does not obviate the importance of market share presumptions in
the merger context. See, e.g., Harry First & Eleanor M. Fox, Philadelphia National Bank:
Globalization, and the Public Interest, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 326 (2015) (noting that the shift
from eschewing tests for competitive effects to the market share presumptions in Philadelphia
National Bank “made effective enforcement more likely” because of the focus on both economics
and administration).
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There are limits to what sort of factors may be considered. Most notably in
health care, many economists and others have been skeptical that a merger of
insurance companies may be justified because the merged insurance companies
may be able to get a better price from any provider system; even if the merged
entity can obtain lower prices (which is open to doubt), those lower prices may
not be passed on to customers 107 and may result in reduced provider availability
or reduced quality of medical care. These themes all emerged in the AnthemCigna merger in the district court’s skeptical take on this justification. 108
If this market concentration presumption is not rebutted, it is generally
accepted (albeit with considerable court skepticism) that the merging parties can
assert the defense that a merger is likely to lead to pro-competitive effects, such
as the production of a new product or an improvement in product quality. 109
However, the more concentrated the market, the greater the efficiencies must be,
with a two-to-one merger requiring truly “extraordinary efficiencies.” 110
Moreover, those efficiencies must be merger-specific: The defendants must
show that those efficiencies could not be achieved in other ways, such as by the
formation of a joint venture, and that these efficiencies will benefit consumers
rather than shareholders or managers by showing, for example, that any cost
savings from the merger will be passed on, in whole or in part, to consumers of
their products. 111 Further, these efficiencies must also be verifiable, that is to say
not speculative. 112 Consequently, when merging health care providers have
argued that the merger would allow them to engage in risk-sharing pricing that
will benefit consumers through lower costs and higher quality, the courts have
required those parties to show that such a result could not be achieved through a
looser affiliation. 113
Although historically the courts have been unwilling to block horizontal
provider mergers, 114 that situation changed with the development of new
economic modes of analyzing the competitive effects of these mergers, such as
the two-stage model discussed above. For example, in a recent case in the Ninth
Circuit, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court blocking a
horizontal merger of a provider system, which included physicians and

107. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 33.
108. See United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 249–51 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855
F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
109. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d
775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015).
110. E.g., id. at 790; Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 236.
111. E.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d at 790–91; Anthem, Inc., 236 F.
Supp. 3d at 236–37.
112. See, e.g., Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d. at 236.
113. E.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d at 790–92.
114. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 464, 468–
73 (7th Cir. 2016).
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hospitals, with a physician group in Nampa, Idaho. 115 And there have been even
more recent decisions from the Seventh Circuit 116 and Third Circuit 117 also
barring horizontal provider mergers under this two-stage model.
Similarly, district courts have blocked two blockbuster horizontal insurer
mergers: Aetna-Humana 118 and Anthem-Cigna. 119 Although the merging parties
appealed the Anthem-Cigna merger decision to the District of Columbia Circuit,
that appellate court upheld the district court in a two-to-one decision, forcing
Anthem to abandon the merger. 120
Additionally, as to vertical mergers, the courts have imposed serious
behavioral conditions on vertical provider acquisitions such as instituting a
mandatory arbitration procedure for provider-insurer disputes 121 or pursuant to
a recent decision of the Federal Trade Commission providing incentives to
doctors to allow them to switch medical groups. 122 Antitrust public enforcers
generally have not yet sought to bar these vertical acquisitions because of other
considerations, such as the financial solvency of the providers to be acquired. 123
But with the review of mergers as with the review of conduct, there are
important limitations under antitrust law. Principally, antitrust law does not
address the question of whether a merger should be allowed in the absence of
benefits to competition or to consumers, e.g., if the merger’s competitive effects

115. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d at 792.
116. E.g., Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d at 464, 456–66.
117. E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 333–34 (3d Cir.
2016).
118. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2017).
119. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 179 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855 F.3d
345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
120. United States v. Anthem, 855 F.3d 345, 348–49 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting Anthem’s
contention that the district court erred in rejecting Anthem’s claims of efficiencies from the
merger).
121. See, e.g., Amended Final Order at 2, 8–9, Penn. v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No. 1:13
CV-02647-YK (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2013); Unopposed Motion to Approve and Enter Final Order at
7, Penn. v. Urology of Cent. Penn., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01625-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2011); see also
RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ROBERT A. BERENSON, URBAN INST., CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC
ADVANTAGE: CAN THEY ADDRESS PROVIDER MARKET POWER? 19–20 (2015),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42226/2000111-Certificates-of-PublicAdvantage.pdf.
122. Decision and Order at 7, In re CentraCare Health Sys., Docket No. C-4594 (F.T.C. Jan. 6.
2017).
123. See generally KWOKA, supra note 11, at 140 (noting that antitrust authorities might have
to resort to conduct remedies in extreme circumstances where a provider may fail or where the
merger may result in substantially large merger-specific efficiencies that would otherwise be lost).
But the reluctance to challenge vertical mergers is beginning to change. See State of Cal. v. Valero
Energy Corp. et al., 2017 WL 3705059 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017). How this will play out in the
health care space remains to be seen.
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are neutral 124 or are otherwise difficult to ascertain. This is an important point:
The correlation between substantial increases in market concentration in an
industry and increases in price 125 suggests that the toll on the general economy
from allowing certain mergers could be greater than one would think, which is
a point supported by recent evidence that mergers cannot simply be presumed to
be efficient as a general rule. 126 Finally, as with coordinated reductions in input
prices by downstream purchasers, the courts struggle with whether reductions in
input prices arising from the merger of two downstream purchasers of that input
are anti-competitive even if those reductions are not market wide or even if those
reductions could translate into, or do translate into, lower quality or provider
availability. 127
In summary, whether to allow mergers in certain areas already subject to
extensive regulation can involve social trade-off issues that in involving noncompetition related goals go beyond antitrust law. Correspondingly, these
points, when all taken together, do support a call for a more systematic
legislatively-imposed process for reviewing mergers in an industry, specifically
where that industry may be highly regulated and difficult to enter to begin
with, 128 that would supplement the more case-by-case competition-based focus
of antitrust law.
F.

Antitrust Remedies
Ultimately, while antitrust law can be quite supple in the conduct remedies
that can be imposed through settlements and court actions, there are limitations
in how far conduct remedies can go. 129 If an action is brought based on illegal

124. Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (explaining that
conduct is not illegal under a rule of reason analysis if the agreement on its face “might plausibly
be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition”).
125. See Peter C. Carstensen, The Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: Merger Analysis
in an Unpredictable World, 80 ANTIRUST L.J. 219, 247 (2015).
126. See, e.g., at 252; Philadelphia National Bank at 50: An Interview with Judge Richard
Posner, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 216–17 (2015).
127. See Carstensen, supra note 125, at 254.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 221–22 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d,
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
129. See, e.g., New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 152, 178, 183–84 (D.D.C.
2002). The Microsoft case is an interesting example as to the ill-understood efficacy of conduct
remedies in many cases. See id. While the district court rejected the “structural” kind of remedies
proposed by California and several other states (the California Group), the conduct remedies
obtained by the U.S. DOJ and other states, as modified by certain provisions obtained by the
California Group, involved extensive conduct remedies, including remedies involving related
markets and ongoing monitoring of new technologies developed by Microsoft to ascertain
compliance. See id. at 183–84, 186. Those measures had a much more salutary effect than they get
credit for in restoring competition to technology and software markets that are intertwined with the
internet even if they may not have been as effective as structural relief would have been. See
Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 95. For a fuller analysis see, for example, id. at 94–117.
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conduct, remedies may involve a cessation of the illegal conduct in question,
disgorgement of profits, compliance training, and other measures in the affected
markets or closely related markets designed to restore competition going
forward. 130 However, the courts have become more reluctant to order structural
remedies, such as the divestment of assets or the breakup of a firm in the case of
a monopoly. 131 This is important because structural relief can be viewed by
courts as being easier to implement than conduct relief, as the latter requires
ongoing judicial supervision. 132
If an action is brought to block a merger, remedies may include blocking the
merger, even retrospectively (after the fact) 133 or implementing measures that
fall short of outright blocking it. That latter set of measures can include the
divestment of assets to a third party and the imposition of conditions with
ongoing monitoring from the court and from government agencies. 134
The divestment of assets in a merger context can be a preferred option where
there is a willing third party, where the assets to be divested are complete enough
that the third party can viably compete, and where the negative competitive
effects of the merger would be eliminated or substantially mitigated by such a
divestment. 135 However, there are two questions with such a divestment: (1) Are
the issues involved, such as the assignment of contracts, back office support,
monetary resources, access to technology, and government approvals of such
complexity that a divestment would likely fail to create a viable competitor?;136
and (2) Would the third party use the divested assets to become a viable
competitor?
130. See, e.g., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Settlements Totaling $4.95
Million with LG, Hitachi, Panasonic, Toshiba and Samsung over Price-Fixing Scheme, ST. CAL.
DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 30, 2016), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-dharris-announces-settlements-totaling-495-million-lg (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
131. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105–07 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (imposing
structural relief via a retrospective Clayton Act case to remedy anti-competitive effects of an
acquisition is easier than imposing such relief for monopolistic conduct).
132. See KWOKA, supra note 11, at 133–34.
133. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 571–72, 578 (1972) (affirming
comprehensive relief—divestiture, supply requirements, behavioral requirements, and protections
for divested assets and employees—to ensure the restoration of competition on an acquisition that
was several years old when challenged by the federal government); St. Alphonsus Medical CenterNampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Care Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the district court’s divestiture order was amply justified even though the merger took place
prior to the district court’s hearing because there was testimony from the acquired physician’s group
that they could compete independently because: (1) employees of the group had been told they
would have their jobs no matter what, and (2) the acquiring system had agreed to pay nine million
dollars to the acquired physician’s group as part of the merger).
134. See, e.g., KWOKA, supra note 11, at 128, 139.
135. See e.g., id. at 128–30, 133.
136. See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, United States v. Haliburton Co, No. 1:16-cv-00233-UNA (D.
Del. Apr. 6, 2016).
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Accordingly, examples exist where such divestments in the past did not
achieve the desired result of preventing an increase in prices. 137 The need for
courts to ensure that viable third-party competitors arise out a divestment
process also presents difficult questions for the courts to answer: (1) Can direct
monitoring of such competitors ever take place once a divestment occurs and if
so, when would it be appropriate?; (2) Is it easy to address a short-run exit
problem if one, in fact, occurs even with such direct monitoring?; (3) How much
due diligence can one do beforehand as to the viability of a third-party
competitor, and should competitive commitments be required from such third
parties beforehand?
That leaves behavioral conduct remedies that regulate or cabin the conduct
of a firm in some manner but do not require the breakup of that firm itself or the
spin-off of assets. As noted above, conduct remedies are quite common where
vertical mergers are concerned, 138 such as in the telecommunications industry
where a federal regulator, the Federal Communications Commission, is involved
as well as state and federal antitrust agencies. 139 In that industry, though these
conduct remedies—such as imposing net neutrality, non-retaliation, and/or
equal access type of provisions to avoid content discrimination or
disadvantaging competitors—can appear to be limited, but these remedies can,
in fact, succeed in mitigating or preventing the negative anti-competitive effects
of such mergers. 140
In health care, the federal agencies prefer not to use such conduct remedies
in the context of horizontal mergers, a stance validated by the courts. 141
However, the states—faced with hospitals that may fail unless they are acquired,
hospitals for which continued community service is essential, or provider
systems whose acquisitions may only enhance market power at the margins—
have been more willing to use creative conduct remedies. For example, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General has used conduct remedies to address provider
acquisitions, including such remedies as barring higher hospital-based prices for
services rendered by newly acquired physicians and requiring its newly acquired
providers to have a separate and independent negotiating team to negotiate
prices in good faith with insurers. 142 If insurers cannot negotiate what they
believe to be a fair price from the provider, they may request arbitration with
certain guaranteed processes to ensure a fair outcome. 143
137. See, e.g., KWOKA, supra note 11, at 107–08, 120.
138. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
139. See Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 152–53.
140. See, e.g., id. at 79, 126–57.
141. See, e.g., St. Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Care Sys., 778
F.3d 775, 793 (9th Cir. 2015).
142. Amended Final Order at 14, supra note 121, at 8, 14.
143. See, e.g., Final Order at 7–10, Commonwealth of Penn. v. Urology of Central Penn., Inc.,
No. 1:11-cv-01625-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). Albeit in a non-health care context, the
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Those conduct remedies can be effective, but there are limits to how far one
can go with them in the merger context. For example, the Massachusetts
Attorney General, faced with the acquisition of two hospitals that she thought
might fail by a provider system that already had market power, entered into a
settlement allowing the acquisition to proceed in exchange for the imposition of
several conditions applicable to the entire provider system, such as a six and
one-half year price cap across the entire provider system, restrictions on future
acquisitions, and an allowance for insurers to purchase a la carte access to the
different components of that system. 144 Ultimately, that Massachusetts
settlement, in contrast to the settlements in Pennsylvania, was disapproved by
the state court because it involved complex provisions applicable to the entire
provider system (such as the price cap) that required close ongoing judicial
supervision. 145
In short, as far as conduct remedies in the merger space are concerned, the
more complex the remedies in combination with ongoing supervision required
by the court, the more the courts may look askance at such remedies. The more
those remedies are cabined so that they do not involve the courts directly making
complex determinations such as pricing, and the more that violations can be
resolved with minimal court processes such as the use of fair and voluntary
arbitration processes in provider-insurer negotiations or the use of a courtappointed special master or monitor, 146 the more successful such conduct
remedies can be. 147

California Attorney General has used a similar, voluntary, and fair arbitration process to avoid
judicial concerns over the supervision of potentially complex court terms. See Final Judgment and
Order Pursuant to Stipulation at 5–6, State of Cal. v. Pratibha Syntex, LTD., No. BC499751 (Cal.
Super. Dec. 15, 2015); see also Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Landmark
Settlement with Pratibha Syntex Ltd., OFF. OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 28, 2015), http://oag.
ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-landmark-settlementpratibha-syntex (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
144. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Joint Motion for Entry of Amended Final
Judgment by Consent at 3, 10, 12–13, 16, Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., No.
SUCV2014-02033-BLS2 (Sup. Ct. Mass. Jan. 29, 2015).
145. Id. at 15–16, 46–48.
146. It has been suggested to the author of this article that state agencies could serve in such a
role along with special masters and monitors. While state agencies would need to have the statutory
authority necessary to serve in such a role, one could imagine cases involving joint jurisdiction by
both a court and a state agency in which they may both work together to craft and supervise
otherwise complex remedies over a long period of time until new competition emerges. See e.g.,
BOVBJERG & BERENSON, supra note 121, at 1–2, 4–5, 11, 20–23 (discussing the exercise of joint
jurisdiction of a state agency and the Attorney General of North Carolina over a provider system
pursuant to the certificate of public advantage process).
147. As far as Microsoft involved the use of monitors by the two separate government enforcer
groups, it too fits the pattern of using out-of-court methods to enable the enforcement of an
otherwise complex court decree to occur in a manner that would not ensnare the court in
determinations that either would be difficult or would involve minutiae. See New York v. Microsoft
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Ultimately, however, the discussion in this section illustrates the practical
limitations that can adhere to antitrust remedies in the judicial setting while
facilitating competition as policy. Correspondingly, the discussion of antitrust
principles and remedies—and their limits—raises the question of whether other
measures exist that can go beyond antitrust in implementing competition as
policy. It is to that question that this article now turns.
III. CONTRASTING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT WITH INCENTIVES TO INCREASE
COMPETITION
Antitrust enforcement’s goal, in the first instance, is not to increase
competition over what prevailed in the status quo ante, i.e., what prevailed prior
to the commission of anti-competitive conduct or an anti-competitive
acquisition. 148 However, providing incentives can result in such an increase in
competition. To give one relatively simple example, a serious and credible
suggestion has been made that prizes be awarded to further development of
pharmaceutical alternatives. 149 This could have a substantial impact on the
development of drugs for which conventional incentives may not suffice, such
as improved antibiotics, cheaper insulin, or medications to treat rare diseases.
Significant, albeit more complex, examples of such pro-competitive
incentives abound in health care. For example, California has passed a series of
laws over the past couple of years to increase price transparency in the selection
of providers on one’s health insurance; that transparency is designed to give
consumers the tools necessary to select lower cost providers of quality health
care. 150 Covered California, the agency that runs the intrastate regional
exchanges for the sale of insurance policies in the individual and small group
markets under the ACA, 151 promulgated regulations requiring insurers to report
on those providers who provide either the costliest service or the lowest quality
services (measured based on benchmarks set by Covered California) and then
either provide a remedial plan or explain the circumstances as to why insurers
continue to contract with those providers. 152 These regulations give insurers an

Corp., 224 F. Supp.2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2002); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 81–82 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
148. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES 1 (June 2011), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/272350.pdf.
149. See Bryan P. Schwartz & Marhi Kim, Economic Prizes: Filling the Gaps in
Pharmaceutical Innovation, COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH 1, 47–
48
(2005),
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/CIPIHSubmissionsBryan
Schwartz.pdf?ua=1.
150. See, e.g., Health Care Coverage: Provider Contracts: Hearing on S.B. 751 Before the
Assembly Comm. on Health, 2011–12 Leg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2011).
151. What is Covered California?, COVERED CAL., https://www.coveredca.com/what-iscovered-california/ (last visited November 4, 2017).
152. See, e.g., Attachment 7: Quality, Network Management, Delivery System Standards and
Improvement Strategy, COVERED CAL. 3–4 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/
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incentive to contract with low-cost providers that can provide quality medical
care, and are reasonably accessible, over those higher-cost providers that may
not be better in terms of quality medical care or accessibility. Additionally,
incentives exist on the federal level, such as those encouraging the formation of
risk-sharing Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) involving an arrangement
between various providers and insurers. 153
While these incentives can and do encourage competition, they can also be
gamed or hindered such that their goals of furthering competition are not partly
or fully realized. A provider with market power can form an ACO that does
nothing more than reduce monopoly profits, possibly in exchange for a grant of
exclusivity to safeguard those profits. 154 Even an insurer desiring to fulfill the
goals of Covered California cannot force providers with market power to allow
for steering, tiering, and all-or-nothing contracting—given Covered California
may arguably lack direct authority over providers. 155 As illustrated by these
examples, there is thus a need in thinking about competition as policy to go

2016/2-18/2017%20QHP%20Issuer%20Contract%20Attachment%207_February%2018_2016_
CLEAN.pdf; Cal. Health Benefit Exchange Board Minutes, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE
BD. (Jan. 21, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2016/2-18/January%2021%202015%20
Minutes%20FINAL.pdf; Cal. Health Benefit Exchange Board Minutes, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT
EXCHANGE BD. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2016/4-07/HBEX%20
Board%20Meeting%20February%202016.pdf; Cal. Health Benefit Exchange Board Resolution
No. 2016-09, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE BD. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/
meetings/2016/4-07/HBEX%20Board%20Meeting%20February%202016.pdf. A somewhat
parallel example exists in Massachusetts—with efforts having been made to encourage insurers to
enter global or capitated pricing arrangements with providers to share upside and downside risk
that have had success—though more remains to be done. MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN.,
EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 1, 14 (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/cctcd5.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027–
67,028 (Oct. 28, 2011); see also, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 230
(D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
154. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,029.
155. See ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, NAT’L ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, STATE
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RISING PRICES CAUSED BY HEALTH CARE CONSOLIDATIONS 7 (2017),
http://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Consolidation-Report.pdf;
COVERED
CALIFORNIA, COVERED CALIFORNIA QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN INSURER CONTRACT FOR 2016
BETWEEN COVERED CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE (“THE
EXCHANGE”) AND (“CONTRACTOR”) 36–40 (2016), http://hbex.coveredca.com/PDFs/2016_QHP
_Issuer_Model_Contract_and_Attachments.pdf. These incentives need not necessarily be
subsidies. That being said, subsidies can be awarded and disbursed in a neutral administrative
manner to jumpstart competition in new industries or enable research and development to create
new markets. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS AND ISSUES 7, http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/2498389.pdf.
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beyond the use of incentives as well as beyond vigorous antitrust enforcement,
thus setting the stage for this article’s discussion of market-governance rules.
IV. THE USE OF MARKET-GOVERNANCE RULES AS A COMPLEMENT TO
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE USE OF INCENTIVES TO ENHANCE
COMPETITION
Market-governance rules fill the gaps in otherwise vigorous antitrust
enforcement and in incentives to foster competition, thereby complementing
these measures in facilitating competition as policy reform. To understand this
supplemental but important role that market-governance rules play in fostering
competition as policy reform, this article will first discuss the use of public
interest review of mergers in other industries and next the use of marketgovernance rules in health care in Massachusetts as well as in a limited
regulatory way in California. This section will turn to legislation proposed in
California in the 2015 to 2016 legislative year and re-introduced in the current
2017 to 2018 legislative year.
A.

Public Interest Review of Mergers and Acquisitions
In regulated industries, mergers and acquisitions go through a public interest
review process that takes place in front of the federal or state agencies
responsible for supervising those industries. 156 That process does not ignore or
obviate the competition-related analysis inherent in antitrust law; indeed, a
review of these mergers or acquisitions for competition-related concerns takes
place as part of this public interest process. 157
However, a public interest review process can go beyond antitrust law in
important ways. First, it can help guarantee that a merger will have beneficial
effects on competition by guaranteeing continued, vigorous competition in
existing markets and/or by requiring expansion into new markets, all as

156. INT’L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV.,
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST: FINAL
REPORT 87, 148 (2000).
157. In California, the Antitrust Section of the California Attorney General’s Office conducts
such an analysis as part of the public interest review process for telecommunications (on the state
level), CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 854 (effective Jan. 1, 1996), and for not-for-profits, see, e.g.,
Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12588, repealed
and added by 1959 Cal. Stat. 1258. In contrast, in the federal process for reviewing
telecommunications mergers and acquisitions, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. DOJ plays an
important role in reviewing such mergers and acquisitions for competition-related concerns. See,
e.g., Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 152, 155. While state and federal antitrust agencies
can play an important role in providing a competition analysis to their sister regulatory agencies, it
is noteworthy—and important—that they retain the right to conduct an independent investigation
and bring their own action in court because there are cases where mergers need to be blocked out
of the gate due to substantial actual or likely inimical effects on competition. See, e.g., id. at 153–
55.
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buttressed by financial and other resource commitments. 158 Examples of these
guarantees would include the commitments obtained by the Department of
Managed Health Care and the Department of Insurance (though neither has an
express public interest review process) from the parties to the Centene-Health
Net merger. 159 Second, a public interest process can better ensure the viability
of a third-party acquirer of assets from the merging party to ensure that
competition will continue to take place in a state, as witnessed again by the
example of financial and resource commitments obtained from the parties to the
Centene-Health Net merger by the Department of Managed Health Care and the
Department of Insurance. 160 Third, this public interest review process may
provide an easier path than antitrust law to address monopsony issues in the
context of already highly-regulated industries 161—even though antitrust law can
and should continue to vigorously address these issues. 162
In fact, market regulators not only have great experience with the ongoing
supervision of businesses in their markets but also have administrative subpoena
and enforcement tools if businesses should violate their commitments. And
while administrative enforcement actions are ultimately reviewed by the courts,
such a review can take place under a deferential standard. 163
B.

Legislative and Regulatory Market-Governance Measures
As noted above, antitrust law may have limits in addressing conduct that,
when adopted in whole or in part on an independent basis by several participants,
can inhibit competition on a market-wide scale. However, state legislatures can

158. See Leemore Dafny et al., More Insurers Lower Premiums: Evidence from Initial Pricing
in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, 1 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 53, 57, 79 (2015) (“[P]remium[s]
[on the Exchanges] would have been reduced by 5.4 percent had United entered all markets.”).
159. See, e.g., In re Application of Centene Corp., Chopin Merger Sub I, Inc., & Chopin Merger
Sub II, Inc., No. APP-2015-00889 2–3, 7–8 (Cal. Ins. Comm’r Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.insur
ance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2016/Centene/upload/DecisionOrderHealthNet
Centene.pdf; Undertakings at 10, In the Matter of Centene Acquisition of Health Net (Cal. Dept.
Managed Health Care Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.dmhc.ca.gov/Portals/0/AbouttheDMHC/News
Room/u032216.pdf.
160. See, e.g., In re Application of Centene Corp. et al., supra note 159. at 7–8; Undertakings,
supra note 159, at 2–10.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 252 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d,
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Supreme Court precedent indicates that courts should not be in the
business of making policy determinations about the appropriate allocations of healthcare dollars;
those are value judgment that are better directed to the legislature.”).
162. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235–36
(1948); West Penn Alleghany Health Sys., Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 627 F.3d 85, 103
(3d Cir. 2010); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988–89, 989 n.6 (9th Cir.
2000); Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 252–53.
163. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a)–(c) (2012); CAL. EVID. CODE § 664 (2012); see
also JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 573–75, 81 (Ct. App.
2006).
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and have passed laws that can, in supple or targeted ways, proscribe such
conduct and in so doing enhance competition. 164 Similarly, state regulators can
also play such a role where authorized to do so by state legislatures. 165
As also noted above, antitrust law may be inhibited from addressing social
trade-offs, such as balancing competition goals against consumer protection
goals or determining what qualifies as an insurance product suitable for health
care markets. However, addressing such social trade-offs is better suited for the
legislature and for regulators in lieu of the courts applying antitrust law, as
remarked by the district court in the Anthem-Cigna merger trial. 166
Most notably, the Massachusetts Attorney General conducted a study of the
health care markets on how large provider systems used all-or-nothing and antitiering/anti-steering contractual provisions to force insurers to increase prices 167
to the determinant of self-insured companies and of consumers forced to pay
higher premiums. Based on that study, the Massachusetts Legislature passed
laws that barred such contractual conditions. 168 Those laws, in turn, successfully
increased demand for tiering products though work remains to be done in
Massachusetts on price transparency and tiered-product design to take full
advantage of these laws. 169
In addition, the California Department of Insurance and the California
Department of Managed Health Care had to wrestle with balancing competition
and consumer protection goals in setting out network adequacy standards. 170
These standards had to include default rules to govern the adequacy of provider
networks provided by insurance companies as part of their insurance products
so that users of these products would have reasonable assurances that they would
have close-by alternatives for their medical care. 171 At the same time, these
164. That same point was made recently, for example, by the White House under the Obama
Administration. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 4, at 2, 6, 8.
165. See Martin Gaynor, Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the
Enforcement and Policy Maze, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1088, 1090 (2014). For a discussion of examples
at the federal level, see COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 4, at 11–12.
166. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 252 (“Supreme Court precedent indicates that courts
should not be in the business of making policy determinations about the appropriate allocations of
healthcare dollars; those are value judgments that are better directed to the legislature.”).
167. COAKLEY, supra note 78, at 3–5, 41–42.
168. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176J, § 11 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176O, § 9A (2017).
169. MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 151, at 7–13, 28.
170. See Deborah Reidy Kelch, Health Insurance Oversight in California:Observations on the
Post-ACA Environment, HEALTH INS. ALIGNMENT PROJECT 4, http://www.kelchpolicy.com/sites/
default/files/insert/Health%20Insurance%20Oversight%20in%20California-Post%20ACA%20
June%202015.pdf; STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF INS., Network Adequacy Regulation (Permanent):
Initial Statement of Reasons, CAL. HOSP. ASS’N 2 (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.calhospital.org/
sites/main/files/file-attachments/init_statement_of_reasons.pdf.
171. See Medicaid Managed Care Final Rule: Network Adequacy Standards, STATE OF CAL.—
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY, DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS. 9, 31 (July 19, 2017),
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/Documents/FinalRuleNAFinalProposal.pdf.
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standards also had to allow for the consideration of circumstances—including in
principle competition-related issues—under which these default standards could
be waived. 172
C. Proposed Additional Market-Governance Laws in California
It has been suggested that enacting laws in California like those enacted in
Massachusetts, as discussed in the prior section of this article, would have a
salutary effect on restoring more symmetrical bargaining power between
provider systems and insurers; in particular, such laws would mitigate the
negative effects of provider market concentration on pricing for products sold
on Covered California’s regional exchanges. 173 Moreover, for reasons discussed
above, the extension of public interest review to insurance mergers in the health
care space in California would seem to be a natural extension of the current use
of that review in telecommunications and the not-for-profit sector.
As it turns out, to achieve these goals, legislation was proposed in the
California Senate in the 2015 to 2016 legislative year 174 and again in the 2017
to 2018 legislative year. 175 The current draft of this legislation in the 2017 to
2018 legislative year involves two bills: Senate Bill 538 and Assembly Bill
595. 176

172. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.51(d)(H) (2017).
173. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 34; see also Fuse Brown, supra note 16, at 112–13
(arguing that market approaches based on patient information or active purchasing by insurers
cannot work “where there is little choice or competition between providers”); id. at 140 (referencing
the need for private insurers and employers to “bargain aggressively”); Berenson et al, supra note
15, at 976 (referencing one reason for the growth of health care systems via cross-market mergers
as the desire of providers to acquire leverage over insurers).
174. S. COMM. ON HEALTH REPORT, S.B. 538, at 6 (Apr. 17, 2017) (discussing S.B. 932),
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB538 (last
visited Nov. 21, 2017).
175. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2017).
176. Senate Bill 538 is on the California Legislature’s two-year cycle such that it can be taken
up again in the Assembly in January 2018 after having passed the Senate on May 31, 2017. See
S.B. 538, supra note 175; The California Legislative Process, CAL. STATE UNIV.,
http://www.calstate.edu/AcadSen/Records/Agenda/documents/The_California_Legislative_Proc
ess.pdf. Assembly Bill 595 was placed into the suspense file by the Assembly Committee on
Appropriations after having passed the Assembly Committee on Health, AB-595 Health Care
Service Plans: Mergers and Acquisitions., CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB595 (last visited Nov. 21, 2017), which had
indicated that it is most likely dead for the rest of the 2017 to 2018 legislative session, see Laurel
Rosenhall, The Suspense Files: California Bills Vanish Almost Without a Trace, CALMATTERS
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://calmatters.org/articles/capitol-suspense-california-bills-vanish-almost-with
out-trace/, although it can always be reintroduced in the new legislative session. However,
Assembly Bill 595 was just resurrected in January 2018 and passed by the Assembly, after first
being amended, and is now in front of the Senate. Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2018).
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Senate Bill 538 is designed to prohibit contracts between hospitals (defined
as including general acute care hospitals, acute psychiatric hospitals, and
specialty hospitals) and insurers from including certain terms: (1) requiring an
insurer to contract with any one (or more) of a hospital’s affiliates (with a
significant exception for physician medical groups affiliated with that hospital),
(2) setting payment rates for affiliates of the hospital that are not participating in
that insurer’s network, (3) requiring insurers and self-insureds to agree to
arbitration of state and federal antitrust claims as a condition for a hospital’s
entering into a contract (but with an exception for consensual agreements), and
(4) requiring that services provided by a hospital and its affiliates not have to be
compensated at the same rate as all other in-network hospitals and their
affiliates. 177 The bill also contains certain provisions designed to avoid creating
an asymmetrical bargaining relationship favoring insurers and self-insureds over
providers; in addition to the carve outs mentioned just above, these provisions
include a requirement that insurers not disclose contract rates to self-insureds
without reasonable non-disclosure agreements. 178
Assembly Bill 595 would require insurance companies (including hospital
providers that offer insurance plans) to obtain prior approval from the
Department of Managed Health Care before merging with, acquiring, or
obtaining direct or indirect control over another insurance plan (referred to in
this paragraph as proposed acquisition). 179 That department can grant approval
if it finds the following: the proposed acquisition “[p]rovides short-term and
long-term benefits in the form of lower prices, better quality, improved access
to care, and reduced health disparities”; the proposed acquisition “[d]oes not
adversely impact competition”; the proposed acquisition “[d]oes not jeopardize
the financial stability of the parties”; the proposed acquisition “[d]oes not result
in a significant effect on the availability or accessibility of existing health care
services”; and the proposed acquisition is not being undertaken by a party that
fails to follow state and federal laws and regulations, including those of that
department. 180 In reaching these findings, that department would be required to
review an assessment by the California Attorney General as to “whether

177. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
178. Id. This bill presently includes a provision that does not allow providers to bind “payors”
(i.e., self-insureds) to the terms of provider contracts. Id. This article does not take a position on
the underlying issues being addressed by this provision except to note that the author’s personal
view is that such a provision is not needed to address those issues already addressed by the ban on
coerced antitrust arbitration clauses in provider contracts with insurance companies. See infra note
186 and accompanying text.
179. Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). The bill was amended on April
3, 2017 to remove the Department of Insurance as a state agency that would also have authority
over proposed mergers and acquisitions involving health care insurers. Id. The effects of this
amendment are beyond the scope of this article.
180. Id.
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competition would be adversely affected and what mitigation measures could be
adopted” to avoid that result in what the bill labels an advisory opinion. 181
The Department of Managed Health Care would not, however, be required
to vote up or down on the proposed acquisition. 182 Rather, it could accept
mitigation measures proposed by the parties, or impose its own, to remedy
deficiencies it may find in the proposed acquisition, specifically adverse effects
on cost, quality, access to services, or health disparities. 183
Together these two market-governance rules can address potential gaps in
antitrust enforcement and in the use of incentives in the health care space in
California without displacing either of those alternatives. Senate Bill 538
proposes pro-competitive rules, of immediate impact, that could restore
symmetrical bargaining power between insurers and providers. 184 First, it bars
out anti-competitive conduct by providers akin to tying such as all-or-nothing,
anti-steering, and anti-tiering conduct. 185 Second, it bars coerced antitrust

181. Id. The bill was amended on January 22, 2018 to remove the provision allowing the
Attorney General to submit an assessment as to the adverse effect of the merger on competition.
Id. Instead, it requires the Department of Managed Health Care to engage in that exercise with the
Department now having the power to hire consultants to assist it in that exercise. Id. The removal
of the Attorney General’s role in issuing an advisory opinion on the adverse competitive effects of
these mergers, which is unexplained in the legislative history, lessens the benefits of this bill’s
enhancement of competition as far as it fails to take advantage of an agency with considerable
experience on the anti-competitive effects arising from mergers. Nonetheless, the Attorney General
retains the power to investigate, and if appropriate seek to enjoin, these mergers under state and
federal antitrust law. See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 283–85, 296–97
(1989); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal. 1998) (finding
that a prior holding of the California Supreme Court—that state Unfair Competition Law could not
be applied to a merger—was overruled by a subsequent statutory amendment of that
law), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v.
Mervyn’s, LLC, 138 P.3d 207, 209 (Cal. 2006).
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
185. See id.; see also Thompson, supra note 8, at 34.
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arbitration clauses, 186 which raise issues that go beyond the theoretical. 187 Thus,
Senate Bill 538 provides market-wide relief that goes beyond what antitrust law
can provide, while strengthening federal and state incentives to enhance
competition, such as those put into place by Covered California to encourage
insurers to reduce costs and improve quality of care in their contracts with
providers. 188
186. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). As noted above, firms with market
power can use antitrust arbitration clauses essentially to shield anti-competitive conduct from
antitrust scrutiny—adding arbitral requirements that procedurally and substantively disadvantage
challenges to their market power versus what the antitrust laws themselves may provide. See
Lemley & Leslie, supra note 90, at 41, 47. Although preemption issues under the Federal
Arbitration Act are beyond the scope of the paper, this proposed provision may not, in fact, be
preempted under that act. First, as far as it is one provision of a comprehensive legislative scheme
to address alleged abuses of market power by health care systems, it does not single arbitration out
for disparate treatment as was the case in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark.
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–28 (2017) (voiding a Kentucky
Supreme Court rule preventing individual with general power of attorney from agreeing to
arbitration clauses in contract unless the representative with that power obtained a specific waiver
of the right to go to court and the right of trial by jury; such rulings did not put arbitration provisions
on an equal footing with other contractual provisions or require specific waivers of other
constitutional rights). In that sense, this proposed requirement functions as a safeguard akin to the
unconscionability doctrine under state law; that latter doctrine of which in turn survives federal
preemption because it focuses on whether a party lacked meaningful choice on an arbitration term
or provision that is one-sided, rather than on whether that arbitration term or provision was more
informal than what would obtain in court. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. MDL
No. 2036, 685 F.3d 1269, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2012); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 353
P.3d 741, 748 (Cal. 2015) (unconscionability “is concerned not with a ‘simple old-fashioned bad
bargain’ but with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party’”) (first quoting
Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Ky. 2012); then quoting 8
Williston on Contracts §18:10 (4th ed. 2010)); Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 741 (finding that this standard
applies as equally to arbitration provisions as to non-arbitration provisions); see also McGill v.
Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 97 (Cal. 2017) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) for the proposition that arbitration “is a matter of
consent, not coercion”). Second, even if that provision could be viewed in isolation, it is still not
preempted because it only addresses coerced arbitral clauses that have been effectively and
impermissibly used to strip statutory rights set out in federal and state antitrust laws. See e.g., Am.
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013); id. at 2313–14 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting); McGill, 393 P.3d at 97.
187. See, e.g., Chad Terhune, Big California Firms Take On Health-Care Giant over Cost of
Care, NPR (Apr. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/04/07/473253558/
big-california-firms-take-on-health-care-giant-over-cost-of-care (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
188. In addition to the Thompson study cited above, Thompson, supra note 8, other noted health
care economists who led a distinguished task force examining market concentration issues in health
care have just called directly for states both to invigorate antitrust enforcement and to enact such
laws to bring more competition into the health care sector. See Gaynor et al., supra note 11, at iii,
2. The need for such anti-tying rules as part of a combined strategy also arose, albeit more
indirectly, in the analysis of whether changes should be imposed to the regulatory framework
applicable under the certificate of public advantage accorded in North Carolina to the combined
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Assembly Bill 595 mandates that no proposed acquisition can be approved
if it would be found anti-competitive, 189 thus cementing the primacy of
satisfying the competitive analysis required by antitrust. But it also goes beyond
antitrust in requiring that the proponents of that acquisition also show how
consumers would, in fact, benefit from this acquisition—as measured both by
pricing and non-pricing metrics. 190 And it allows for the institution and
supervision of ongoing requirements as a condition for approving a proposed
acquisition by agencies who are experts in the health care industry either to
remedy any anti-competitive effects or to ensure pro-consumer benefits, 191 a
task that is arguably more suitable for those agencies than for the courts.
As noted above, market studies in Massachusetts paved the way for marketgovernance rules like those proposed in Senate Bill 538. Market studies paved
the way for the successful use by antitrust public enforcers of merger laws to bar
horizontal provider mergers and insurer mergers. Here, too, economic studies
support the institution of California’s and Massachusetts’s efforts in marketgovernance rules with respect to insurer-provider contracting is concerned. Even
aside from examples previously discussed in this article, one study analyzing
data from 2004 to 2013 found that in California, multi-county hospital systems
as a system could and had charged far higher prices than other providers. 192
Another earlier study came to the same conclusion regarding California in
comparing per-patient costs for being treated in multi-hospital systems to perpatient costs for being treated in single hospitals. 193 The findings of such anticompetitive effects arising from the conduct of health care systems are not
limited to California. 194
V. CONCLUSION
Our political system is structured to give the states an incubator role in
instituting differing approaches to the enactment and enforcement of laws. 195
Over time, the successes and failures of these various approaches inform federal
and state policy-making. Massachusetts served as the model for the ACA 196 and
is now serving as the touchstone for suggested legislation outside of California

Mission-St. Joseph hospital system. See BOVBJERG & BERENSON, supra note 121, at 14, 15, 27
n.18, 28 n.29.
189. Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 100, at 5–6.
193. James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-Owned
and Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1666–67 (2014).
194. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE HEALTH FOUND., supra note 11, at 60, 62–63.
195. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
196. Sharon K. Long et al., Coverage, Access, and Affordability Under Health Reform:
Learning from the Massachusetts Model, 49 INQUIRY 303, 303 (2012).
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to remedy the anti-competitive effects of that provider conduct discussed in the
previous section of this article. 197 Looking through a wider lens, Alaska has
experimented with a reinsurance program that has helped to safeguard insurer
competition in that state and may be a model for other states. 198
In general, health care has been viewed as a quintessential local issue calling
for such experimentation by such diverse sources as the U.S. Supreme Court, 199
regulations under the ACA, 200 and at least one prior Republican proposal in the
U.S. Senate allowing states freedom to keep the ACA regime if they so
wished. 201 And this role of states in experimenting with different local solutions
that can impact federal policy-making not only involves new, market-governing
laws, but also involves the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws; here the states
will continue to play integral roles in such areas as challenges to insurer and
provider mergers. 202
Thus, what states choose to do with competition as policy reform is
important for American health care. This article sets out how competition as
policy within a given state need not involve just a single option such as vigorous
antitrust enforcement. Rather, it can include a medley of options that include
increasing not just antitrust enforcement but also incentives to encourage
competition and market-governance rules. The states instituting such a medley
of options to carry out competition as policy reform can substantially improve
consumer welfare. And this combined approach is a sensible one for the
American states in the twenty-first century for health care: it follows an approach

197. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE HEALTH FOUND., supra note 11, at 6–8, 11–12, 35–39.
198. See Sarah Kliff, How Alaska Fixed Obamacare, VOX.COM (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/13/15262614/obamacare-alaska-reinsurance
(last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
199. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
200. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 13,406, 13,435 (Feb. 27, 2013)
(Health Insurance Market Rules); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310,
18,413, 18,417–19, 18,443 (Mar. 27, 2012) (Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health
Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers).
201. See Patient Freedom Act of 2017, S. 191, 115th Cong. (2017) (“To improve patient choice
by allowing States to adopt market-based alternatives to the Affordable Care Act that increase
access to affordable health insurance and reduce costs while ensuring important consumer
protections and improving patient care.”).
202. See Eric Kroh, Health, Pharma Sectors Will Be FTC Focus, Ohlhausen Says, LAW360
(Mar. 31, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/competition/articles/908609/health-pharmasectors-will-be-ftc-focus-ohlhausen-says?nl_pk=5ce9b545-d29e-40e4-a79a-5b83b95f36ff&utm_
source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=competition (last visited Oct. 14, 2017)
(setting out the remarks of the chair of the antitrust task force of the National Association of
Attorneys General that “state AGs have shown they can step up when needed.”).
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that not only was encouraged under the Obama Administration in the U.S. 203 but
also is being undertaken more widely elsewhere. 204

203. See Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, supra note 4, at 1, 14; see
also Jason Furman, Beyond Antitrust: The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Inclusive
Growth, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 1 (Sept. 16, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de
fault/files/page/files/20160916_searle_conference_competition_furman_cea.pdf (remarks at the
Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy in Chicago, Illinois).
204. See, e.g., Yong Huang & Baiding Wu, China’s Fair Competition Review: Introduction,
Imperfections and Solutions, COMP. POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2017, at 2, 3.

